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Palestinian Public Opinion Poll
Gaza, Political Prospects, Outgoing and Newly-Appointed
Government, Election and Political Support
West Bank and Gaza Strip

Publication date: 13 June 2024

Data collection dates: West Bank (30 April – 9 May 2024); Gaza Strip (wave 1: 1-9 May 2024; wave 2: 21-26 May 2024)

Sample size: 1500 adult Palestinians in the 16 Governorates of the West Bank and Gaza Strip

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Background

This public opinion poll is the second that AWRAD has conducted since the 7th of October 2023. While the first poll was carried out three to four weeks after the start of current hostilities, the present poll was undertaken more than seven months after the war started. At the time field work was conducted, an estimated 35,000 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed, while approximately 80,000 had been injured. More than 75% of Gaza's population has been displaced and more than 70,000 housing units destroyed. In Gaza, especially, the majority of data collection was undertaken after Israel launched its offensive against Rafah and Jabalia, which led to mass displacement and, reflecting the closure of the Rafah and Karm Abu Salem (Kerem Shalom) border crossings, an abrupt shock to the already-catastrophic humanitarian situation.

Methodology (Summary)


A total of 1,500 computer-assisted face-to-face interviews were conducted by a team of gender-balanced career enumerators, each with a minimum of five years of experience in data collection. AWRAD's field team covered all 16 governorates of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in its sample. In the West Bank, fieldwork was completed in a single phase from 30 April to 9 May 2024. In Gaza, the poll was conducted across two phases: the first from 1 to 9 May and the second from 21 to 26 May. Between 3 and 15 May, nearly 600,000 people were displaced from Rafah to Khan Younis and Deir Al Balah due to fighting in the Rafah governorate, and heightened escalation in Jabalia in northern Gaza also occurred, rendering much of these areas inaccessible for fieldwork. Face-to-face interviews had a median duration of 18 minutes, with a response rate of 94%. For a full account of our methodology, please refer to Annexes 1 and 2. A map of the actual enumeration areas per wave is included in Annex 3.

Poll Findings

Overall direction: Optimism amidst desperation

Despite the current conditions, a majority of Palestinians cling to hope for a better future. While 62% of Palestinian respondents believe that things in Palestine are moving in the wrong direction, only 41% expressed pessimism towards the future. Although only one third of respondents believe that things are moving in the right direction, a majority (57%) express optimism for the future.

Figure 1: View of present conditions and future outlook




Palestinians' current assessment of the direction of society and prospects for the future are a reflection of the conditions and needs faced by the population, chiefly: the war in Gaza heightened violence and continued fragmentation in the West Bank, and everyday problems faced by the typical family.

Day-to-Day problems: Economy, High Prices in Gaza and Unemployment in the West Bank

According to the poll, the most pressing day-to-day problems facing Palestinians are related to the economic situation as reported by the majority of respondents, whereby two thirds of selected economic-related problems as their first choice. The top three most pressing problems are inflation/cost of living (36%), followed by unemployment (21%) and challenges facing businesses (8%). This is in addition to 5% who selected poverty as their most important problem. Corruption, lack of safety and crime were the first choice for 5% of the respondents (each).

Figure 2: The most important problem currently faced by respondents



Respondents in Gaza are more likely than their counterparts in the West Bank to consider the following issues as urgent and in need of speedy resolution: High prices, waters shortages, housing, safety and crime, poverty and food security. By contrast, those in the West Bank are more likely to identify unemployment and economic development as urgent concerns than respondents in Gaza.

The above findings underscore Palestinians' widespread concerns about the worsening economy. Nearly nine-in-ten (88%) of West Bank respondents report that their economic situation has worsened compared to a year ago, while 80% say their security situation and feeling of safety has similarly worsened.

Gaza war and peace prospects: Majority support for a 2-state solution and a credible peace process


Amid the war, 54% of all respondents express support for a 2-state solution as a means of resolving the conflict, if it becomes a viable option. Another 14% support a one-state solution with equal rights for Palestinians and Israelis. A federation with Jordan or Egypt is not a popular option, receiving support from less than two percent of the sample.

Respondents in Gaza (77%) support a two-state solution at twice the rate of those in the West Bank (39%), contrary to long standing dynamics of higher support in the West Bank than in Gaza. The comparatively meager rate of support in the West Bank is most likely observing these trends, Palestinians in the West Bank have grown more pessimistic and skeptical of the prospect or benefits of two states, a reflection of the reality on the ground, namely the rapid settlement expansion and deepening isolation of Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, 65% of respondents express support, either strongly or to some extent, for a credible process resulting in a Palestinian state side-by-side with Israel. Once again, support rates are higher in Gaza (84%) than in the West Bank (52%). Further, two in three (67%) Palestinians express support for the Palestinian leadership entering into meaningful negotiations process that can produce an independent state.

Figure 3: Support for a credible peace process and a 2-state solution

IF A MEANINGFUL PROCESS LEADING TO A PALESTINIAN STATE SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH ISRAEL WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT CRISIS, WOULD YOU SUPPORT OR OPPOSE THE PROCESS?



Assessment of key actors in the war in Gaza


Positive evaluations of Hamas’s performance in the ongoing war have declined since AWRAD’s previous poll. While a majority still view the movement’s performance positively, the current approval rate stands at 55%, down from 76% in [November](#). Additionally, support for the decision by resistance factions led by Hamas to launch the attack has decreased significantly. In November 2023, support was at 75%, but it has dropped to 46% by May 2024. Notably, there is a significant gap in support between respondents in Gaza and the West Bank, with 62% in the West Bank and only 21% in the Gaza supporting the decision.

In the context of the war, the Palestinian Authority (PA) continues to be held in lower regard than Hamas, with only 22% of respondents positively evaluating the PA’s performance. Respondents in the West Bank are markedly more positive when assessing the performance of Hamas and its allies (e.g., Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) than those in Gaza. Approximately three-quarters of respondents in the West Bank (76%) positively assess Hamas’s performance, whereas only one-quarter of those in Gaza (24%) express the same view.

Respondents in Gaza view the performance of the PIJ more favorably than Hamas, with 39% holding positive assessments. In the West Bank, 71% positively evaluate the PIJ’s performance, a rate roughly equal to positive assessments of Hamas.

The gap in positive assessments among respondents in Gaza might reflect the belief that Hamas, as the governing authority in Gaza and leading faction in the war, is more accountable than the PIJ for the current circumstances. Consistent with other Hamas allies, Hezbollah is more favorably viewed by respondents in the West Bank (46%) than in Gaza (36%), though the margin is observably smaller.

Figure 4: Positive assessment of key actors by region



The opposite dynamic is observed in assessments of other actors, including political parties, countries in the region and beyond, and international bodies. Specifically, respondents in Gaza are more likely to view these actors favorably than those in the West Bank. For example, while 43%

of respondents in Gaza positively evaluate the performance of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the war, only 1% of those in the West Bank share this assessment. Similar results are observed in assessments of Jordan’s and Egypt’s performance, with respondents in Gaza significantly more likely to positively evaluate the performance of these two states.

Qatar, among all other parties, states, and bodies assessed, is the only actor that is positively evaluated by a majority of those in Gaza (71%) and the West Bank (61%). When assessing the European Union (EU), 45% of respondents in Gaza positively evaluate the bloc’s performance, compared to only 8% in the West Bank. Similarly, 41% of respondents in Gaza positively evaluate the performance of the United Nations (UN), compared to only 4% in the West Bank.


The Day After the War: Majority support a Palestinian-led government in Gaza and the UN to oversee humanitarian efforts

Humanitarian action: 81% in Gaza trust the UN to lead

Despite mixed perceptions of the UN between those in the West Bank and Gaza, the global body is still the most trusted actor to provide humanitarian assistance to Gaza. Among respondents in Gaza, 81% identify the UN as the most trusted actor. Further, despite being less positive towards the UN’s performance in response to the war in Gaza, West Bank respondents (35%) still trust the body more than any others to handle the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The second most trusted actor or institution, according to all respondents, to lead humanitarian action is Hamas (13%), followed by local leaders (12%), Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (8%), and the PA (6%). In Gaza, however, Hamas receives discernably more negative assessments, with only two percent of respondents identifying it as their most trusted actor, compared to eight percent who identify the PA.

Figure 5: Trust levels in actors to lead the provision humanitarian assistance to Gaza




Early recovery: 70% of Gazans trust the UN to lead

Overall, 47% trust UN agencies to lead the early recovery and reconstruction of Gaza, with seven-in-ten (71%) respondents in Gaza expressing such a preference. In contrast, among all respondents, 14% trust Hamas to lead the recovery and reconstruction phase, while 9% trust the PA, 8% trust Arab states, and 7% trust NGOs and local leaders, each.

A gap between respondents in the West Bank and Gaza is once again observed. For example, while 23% of respondents in the West Bank identify Hamas as the most trusted actor to lead early recovery, only 1% of those in Gaza do. In contrast, those in Gaza (15%) are more likely to express trust in the PA than their counterparts in the West Bank (6%).


Figure 6: Trust levels in actors to lead recovery and rebuilding efforts in Gaza by region



Governing Gaza: Majority supports a Palestinian-led Government

When assessing post-war outcomes, the vast majority of Palestinians (80%) prefer a Palestinian-led body to govern Gaza after the war. Support for a Palestinian-led government is higher in the West Bank (86%) than the Gaza Strip (71%), though it constitutes a large majority in both territories. Interestingly, 10% prefer an internationally-led arrangement, and 5% select an Arab-led arrangement. In Gaza, support for an internationally-led arrangement reaches 21%, compared to 3% in the West Bank.


Figure 7: Support levels for varying governance arrangements in Gaza by region



When asked to select the preferred leadership for such a Palestinian government in Gaza, the largest group of respondents (47%) choose a national unity government, while 23% choose a Hamas-led government, 14% a PA-led government, and 8% a technocratic government. Only five percent support an arrangement led by community leaders.

Once more, clear polarization between perceptions of a Hamas or PA-led government is observed between the two regions. While nearly one-third of respondents in the West Bank (31%) prefer a Hamas-led government, only six percent of those in Gaza share this view. The opposite is true when assessing support for a PA government; 27% express support for such an arrangement in Gaza, compared to only 7% in the West Bank.

Figure 8: Most trusted Palestinian actors for leading the government in Gaza



Evaluation of the outgoing Government led by Dr. Mohammad Shtayyeh: Majority dissatisfaction

Palestinians in the West Bank were asked to evaluate the performance of the outgoing government led by Dr. Shtayyeh, with most appraising his tenure negatively. Respondents believe his government was most effective in matters related to infrastructure (33%), followed by support for local government (26%), and provision of basic services (24%).

In contrast, the Shtayyeh Government received the lowest marks in matters related to provision of services to Palestinians in Gaza and achieving economic growth and job creation (8% each), followed by fighting corruption (10%), supporting Palestinians in East Jerusalem (12%), upholding freedom of assembly (12%), freedom of expression and supporting Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank (13% each).

The findings show that Palestinians in the West Bank are generally more satisfied with the performance of local councils than the central government, with 55% expressing positive views of the councils.

Expectations of the new government headed by P.M. Mohammad Mustafa: A minority were able to identify the accurate name of the Prime Minister

Palestinians have limited knowledge of the newly-appointed government, especially in the Gaza Strip. More than one month after its formal inauguration (31 March 2024), one third of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are unaware a new government has been formed. Two-thirds, however, are aware that a new government has been formed, with greater rates of awareness in the West Bank (74%) than Gaza (44%).

Though the majority of respondents are aware that a new government is formed, they are markedly less knowledgeable of its composition. For example, only 32% of respondents were able to accurately name the new Prime Minister. Rates are slightly higher in the West Bank (40%) than Gaza (22%), but also show that, in neither territory is a majority of the population able to identify the current head of the government.

Overall, Palestinians are divided in their expectations for the new government. Half believe (50%) the formation of the new administration is a positive development, while 30% evaluate it negatively. Positive perceptions are higher in Gaza (64%) than in the West Bank (44%).

When asked about the day-to-day priorities for the new government to focus on, overall 39% identify achieving national unity as their first choice, followed by economic development and employment (32%), prioritizing early recovery and reconstruction in Gaza (26%). Other priorities include education (17%), enhancing security (13%), fighting corruption (11%), supporting workers and improving infrastructure (10% each), humanitarian assistance to Gaza (8%), and health (6%).

Elections and political support

A majority of Palestinians (84%) support holding both presidential and legislative elections immediately after the war. Support for such elections is higher in Gaza (90%) than the West Bank (80%), though constitutes a strong majority in both territories.

Presidential election

AWRAD presented respondents with a number of scenarios to gauge their presidential preferences among various political leaders and personalities.

Scenario 1: 13 candidates, including President Mahmoud Abbas

In a crowded field of 13 potential candidates, Mahmoud Abbas would finish fourth, behind Marwan Barghouti, Mohammad Dahlan and Yahya al Sinwar. He would receive a roughly equal vote share as Ismail Haniyeh. In this scenario:

- Marwan Barghouti receives the highest overall potential vote share (33%). He is the most popular candidate in the West Bank (37%) and the second most popular in Gaza (26%).
- Mohammad Dahlan finishes in second place overall, receiving 15% in a hypothetical vote. Dahlan's support is concentrated in Gaza (37%), where he is the most popular candidate. Dahlan loses some potential support by running among other Fatah candidates. In scenarios where he is the only Fatah candidate, he gains more votes in the West Bank.
- Yahya Sinwar finishes in third place, receiving nine percent of the vote. The Hamas leader is more popular in the West Bank (14%) than in Gaza (2%).
- The opposite dynamic is observed in the case of Mahmoud Abbas. Receiving eight percent of the overall vote, the current President is more popular in Gaza (14%) than the West Bank (5%).
- Ismail Haniyeh receives six percent of the overall vote. Like Sinwar, he is more popular in the West Bank (9%) than Gaza (3%).
- Mustafa Barghouti finishes in fifth place, receiving three percent of the vote. Salam Fayyad similarly receives two percent. All other leaders including Husein Al Sheikh (Fatah), Jibril Rojoub (Fatah), Naser al Dinn Al Shaer, Khaled Meshal (Hamas), Hanan Ashrawi, and Ahmad Saadat (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)) receive one percent of the vote or less, each.

Importantly, in such a scenario, 19 percent of eligible voters are presently undecided or would not vote for any of the candidates. In the West Bank, the rate of undecided and abstaining voters reaches 28% of the hypothetical electorate.

Scenario 2: President Abbas does not stand for reelection

In a 12-way race including 4 Fateh leaders, 4 Hamas leaders, and 4 independent or unaffiliated leaders, the results stay very much the same, with minor gains by Marwan Barghouti (from 33% to 36%), Mohammad Dahlan (15% to 17%), and Fayyad (remains at 2%). All other patterns appearing under scenario one continues to apply in this scenario.


Scenario 3: Head-to-head races

In this hypothetical contest, respondents are polled about their preferences in a direct match-up between a Fatah or Fatah associated candidate and a Hamas candidate. In particular, respondents have been asked to share their preferences in elections between four of Fatah’s most likely candidates and Ismail Haniyeh, one of Hamas’ most likely candidates. As illustrated in the figures below, in all match-ups save the one with Marwan Barghouti, the significant share of undecided or abstaining voters will be key to the final result.

Marwan Barghouti vs. Ismael Haniyeh

Marwan Barghouti would win a decisive victory over Ismael Haniyeh, receiving 62% of the overall vote, compared to only 16% for his opponent. Marwan is the only figure of the four potential Fatah candidates that would win an outright victory in a two-way race against Haniyeh.


Figure 9: Marwan Barghouti vs. Ismael Haniyeh



Mohammad Dahlan vs. Ismael Haniyeh

Ismail Haniyeh is as popular as Mohammad Dahlan, with both receiving 30% of the vote share. This is the first poll that reveals such increase in the popularity of Dahlan. With these low levels of support from their population, such a race would be determined by the votes of the undecided, specifically their ultimate turnout and choice of candidate. This is especially true in the West Bank, where undecided (7%) or abstaining voters constitute the majority (44%) of the expected electorate. The findings show that while Haniyeh would win over (41%) of the West Bank vote, the opposite is true for Dahlan, who handily wins (66%) of the vote in Gaza.


Figure 10: Mohammad Dahlan vs. Ismael Haniyeh



President Mahmoud Abbas vs. Ismael Haniyeh

In a contest against Mahmoud Abbas, Haniyeh receives a higher vote share (31 % to 23%). Haniyeh performs especially well in the West Bank, garnering 41% of the vote, compared to Abbas' 9%. However, Abbas is the more popular candidate in Gaza, receiving 45% percent of the vote to Haniyeh's 16%. Once again, undecided and abstaining voters, constituting 46% of the total electorate, will be the decisive variable in such a match-up.


Figure 11: Mahmoud Abbas vs. Ismael Haniyeh



Hussein Al Sheikh vs. Ismael Haniyeh

In a contest between Haniyeh and Hussein Al Sheikh, Haniyeh would get 33% of the vote compared to 20% of the vote for Al Sheikh. As with the race between Haniyeh and Abbas, a matchup between Haniyeh and Hussein Al Sheikh would drive high rates of uncertainty and abstention (47%). This is especially true in the West Bank, where 50% say they are either uncertain (7%) or would not vote (43%) in such a contest.

Figure 12: Hussein Al Sheikh vs. Ismael Haniyeh




Legislative Election: Fateh wins Gaza and Hamas the West Bank

Fatah continues to be the most popular political party among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, supported by 34% of the population. Hamas, by contrast, receives the support of 23%. Consistent with match-ups between figures from these different parties, a hypothetical legislative election would also be characterized by high rates of uncertainty and abstention.

Overall, 36% of the electorate is undecided or would not vote in such a contest, with the rate reaching as much as 48% in the West Bank. One-fifth of voters in Gaza (19%) also say they are unsure or would not vote. These results provide further evidence of a trend observed across AWRAD's polling since 2011, namely that voters in Gaza are more critical of Hamas, while their counterparts in the West Bank are more critical of the PA.

Figure 13: Preferred Political Party in an Upcoming Legislative Election

(Among those who support having an election n=1,255; West Bank = 709, Gaza = 546)




Sources of news

About one third of Palestinians rely on traditional media as their primary source of news, with the rate higher in the West Bank (38%) than Gaza (28%). Given the lack of electricity, functional telecommunications infrastructure, and media equipment (e.g. televisions) in contemporary Gaza.

Palestinians in Gaza Strip (29%) are relying on informal sources at a much higher rate than the West Bank (2%). Social media is the most prevalent source of news (53%) overall, with higher rates of consumption in the West Bank (60%) than Gaza (42%).

Among social media outlets and applications, Telegram (58%) was the most popular source of news overall, with rates of use greater in Gaza (75%) than the West Bank (50%). The second most popular social media source is Facebook (26%), with usage greater in the West Bank (32%) than Gaza (14%). The third source is Instagram (9%), followed by TikTok (3%) and, finally, X (1%).

Figure 14: Most followed social media source
AMONG SOCIAL MEDIA USERS:
WHICH SOCIAL MEDIA SITES DO YOU USE TO RECEIVE NEWS AND INFORMATION?



Annexes

Annex 1: Methodology

Data Collection

A total of 1,500 computer-assisted face-to-face interviews were conducted by a team of gender-balanced career enumerators, each with a minimum of five years of experience in data collection. AWRAD's field team covered all 16 governorates of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in its sample. In the West Bank, fieldwork was completed in a single phase from April 30 to May 9. In Gaza, the poll was conducted across two phases: the first from May 1 to 9 and the second from May 21 to 26. Between May 3 and 15, nearly 600,000 people were displaced from Rafah to Khan Younis and Deir Al Balah due to fighting in the Rafah governorate, and heightened escalation in Jabalia in northern Gaza also occurred, rendering much of these areas inaccessible for fieldwork. A map of the actual enumeration areas per wave is included in Annex 3. Face-to-face interviews had a median duration of 18 minutes, with a response rate of 94%.

Sample

The poll results are based on a random, representative sample of 1,500 adult Palestinians (18 years and older), inclusive of both males and females. The overall margin of error (MoE) is $\pm 3.3\%$, with disaggregation by region and gender enabling MoEs of up to $\pm 5.0\%$. In designing its methodology, sample, and fieldwork plan, AWRAD prioritized the safety of its team without compromising the scientific rigor of the poll.

AWRAD's sample was stratified by governorate and type of population. The number of sites by region and type of dwelling was proportional to the estimated population sizes. Population types varied by territory: in the West Bank, the strata included urban, rural, and camp populations; in the Gaza Strip, the strata included residents in households, formal shelters, and informal shelters. Gender balance was ensured through field sampling quotas.

The sample size calculation was based on the official PCBS 2023 mid-year population projections based on the 2017 National Population Census. Multiple data sources on population movement in Gaza were analyzed to ensure the accuracy of sampling. These included publications on population movements by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which utilized satellite imagery from UNOSAT. Each selected EA was compared against UNOSAT imagery, and estimates of tent coverage were independently produced by AWRAD. Population figures per governorate and municipality in Gaza were triangulated with data independently produced by the Gaza NowPop Project at the University of Oxford.

Sampling Approach

A two-step clustered sampling approach was adopted across the surveyed territories:

1. First Level: Random selection of 116 Enumeration Areas (EAs) from the official 2023 PCBS EA maps. In Gaza, inaccessible, vacant, and areas with active military operations were excluded during data collection. A map of included and excluded enumeration areas is highlighted in

Map 2 in Annex 3. This selection yielded 69 EAs within the West Bank and 47 within the Gaza Strip.

2. Second Level: Within each EA, households were randomly selected using GIS methods. This process involved systematically selecting 13 households through a random walk starting at a randomly selected GIS point. In the second wave where an EA in Gaza included multiple population strata (households, makeshift tent shelters, and official shelters), two to three GIS points were randomly selected within the EA to ensure coverage of each stratum.

Household and Respondent Selection

Enumerators are trained to select and follow systematic random samples. In residential areas of the West Bank and Gaza, enumerators use a systematic count interval to sample every 10th household. In Gaza, all multi-story buildings were treated as one unit, and only one interview was conducted in that building regardless of how many households it holds. Similarly, in informal shelters (tents and makeshift displacement camps) in Gaza, every 10th tent is sampled. In formal shelters within school buildings (classrooms) or shelter buildings (rooms), enumerators count every 5 classrooms or rooms and sample a household within that classroom. The count is done without regard to the number of families within a classroom or room. In rooms with multiple families, the family positioned at 9 o'clock relative to the entrance is selected first, followed by the family at 12 o'clock in the second instance, and then the family at 3 o'clock in the third instance, ensuring systematic randomization.

Once at the household, tent, or shelter room, enumerators utilize Kish tables to ensure the random selection of respondents. Respondent selection is determined through a Kish table listing all family members aged 18 and older from the eldest to the youngest, maintaining a 50/50 gender split.

Weighting

The survey data was weighted to regional PCBS statistics for the West Bank and Gaza in terms of age, gender, and educational attainment. Age and gender adjustments were based on data from the PCBS 2023 Statistical Yearbook, and educational attainment adjustments were based on 2022 PCBS data. This weighting aimed to minimize potential biases and enhance the reliability of the study's findings, thereby providing a more robust and generalizable set of results.

Sample Breakdown

Key sample features are presented in the table below (Full sample distribution within each Region is provided in Annex 2 below).

Governorate	%	Age	%
Hebron	15%	18-25	26%
Bethlehem	4%	26-35	28%
Jerusalem	9%	36-45	17%
Jericho	1%	46-55	15%
Ramallah	8%	56+	13%
Salfit	1%	Marital Status	%
Nablus	9%	Single	27%

Qalqilya	2%	Married	66%
Tulkarem	3%	Divorced/widowed	7%
Jenin	7%	Refugee status	%
Tubas	1%	Refugee	40%
<i>West Bank</i>	60%	Non-refugee	60%
Rafah	17%	Educational level	%
Khan Younis	5%	9 years or less	41%
Deir Al Balah	12%	Secondary (10-12)	28%
Gaza City	5%	1-to-2-year diploma	8%
North Gaza	1%	BA or more	23%
Gaza Strip	40%	Displacement status (Gaza Only)	%
Type of Dwelling (West Bank Only)	%	Displaced	88%
City	15%	Not Displaced	12%
Village	42%	Gender	%
Refugee Camp	3%	Male	51%
Type of Dwelling (Gaza Only)	%	Female	49%
Shelter (formal and informal including makeshift camps)	74%		
Homes	26%		

Quality Control

Quality assurance was applied through direct field supervision, covering 20% of interviews at the field level. Callback validation of select questions was conducted with 17% of the sample. Data quality control included checks on question and questionnaire duration, mapping data collection maps per enumerator to ensure conformity to sampling procedures, as well as analysis of key questions and demographic markers. Data quality control was conducted two days after the beginning of data collection, at the 33%-mark, 67%-mark, and 100%-mark.

Annex 2: Detailed Sample distribution


Attribute	Categories	Gaza		West Bank	
		% within region	% of Total	% within region	% of Total
Type of Residence	Rural	74%	30%	25%	15%
	Urban			70%	42%
	Camp			6%	3%
	Shelter (formal and informal including makeshift camps)				
	Homes	26%	10%		
	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%
Displaced by War	Yes	88%	88%	0%	0%
	No	12%	12%	0%	0%
	Total	100%	100%	0%	0%
Sex of Respondent	Male	50%	20%	51%	30%
	Female	50%	20%	49%	30%
	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%
Age of Respondent	18-25	28%	11%	26%	15%
	26-35	29%	11%	28%	17%
	36-45	18%	7%	16%	10%
	46-55	14%	6%	15%	9%
	56+	10%	4%	15%	9%
	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%
Marital Status	Single	28%	11%	26%	16%
	Married	67%	26%	66%	40%
	Divorced/ Separated	1%	1%	2%	1%
	Widowed	5%	2%	5%	3%
	No answer	0	0%	0%	0%
	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%
Educational Attainment	9 years or less	35%	14%	45%	27%
	10-12 years	31%	12%	26%	16%
	2-year diploma	9%	4%	6%	4%
	BA or more	24%	10%	22%	13%

	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%
Employment Status or Profession	Laborer/worker	9%	4%	12%	7%
	Employee	9%	3%	13%	8%
	Farmer	1%	0%	2%	1%
	Merchant/Owner of business	4%	2%	8%	5%
	Professional (e.g. lawyer, doctor, engineer, expert accountant, IT, etc.)	4%	1%	2%	1%
	Skilled Worker	3%	1%	3%	2%
	Student	9%	3%	8%	5%
	House caregiver	35%	14%	34%	21%
	Retired	2%	1%	2%	1%
	Unemployed	25%	10%	17%	10%
	Total	100%%	40%	100%	60%
Household Size	1-2 members	6%	2%	15%	9%
	3-4 members	21%	8%	28%	17%
	5-6 members	33%	13%	33%	20%
	7-8 members	24%	9%	19%	11%
	9+ members	16%	6%	5%	3%
	Total	100%	40%	100%	60%

Present Governorate of Residence					
Gaza			West Bank		
Categories	% within region	% of Total	Categories	% within region	% of Total
Rafah	42%	17%	Hebron	26%	15%
Khan Younis	12%	5%	Bethlehem	6%	4%
Deir Al Balah	31%	12%	Jerusalem	15%	9%
Gaza City	12%	5%	Jericho	2%	1%
North Gaza	3%	1%	Ramallah	13%	8%
			Salfit	1%	1%
			Nablus	15%	9%
			Qalqilya	4%	2%
			Tulkarem	5%	3%
			Jenin	12%	7%
			Tubas	1%	1%
	Total Gaza	40%		Total West Bank	60%

Annex 3: Map of areas covered by the survey in the West Bank and Gaza


AWRAD's Survey Fieldwork Map 1 – West Bank




■ Reached enumeration areas in the West Bank from April 30th to May 9th, 2024

AWRAD's Survey Fieldwork Map 2 – Gaza





Wave 1 (30 April - 09 May 2024)



Wave 2 (21 - 26 May 2024)



Legend

- | | |
|--|--|
|  Accessible areas |  Reached enumeration areas from April 30th to May 9th, 2024 |
|  Non accessible areas |  Reached enumeration areas from May 21st to May 26th, 2024 |